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PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG TESTING IN THE 
FORMER SOVIET UNION: CONTRACT 
RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS AS BROKER-
DEALERS IN AN EMERGING TESTING 
GROUND FOR AMERICA’S BIG PHARMA 
Yevgenia Shtilman*
Abstract: Developing countries are a fertile testing ground for the re-
search and development of new drug products. Recently, Western phar-
maceutical companies expanded their overseas drug testing from India 
and Africa to the former Soviet Union, where doctors in need of reliable 
income conduct clinical trials on subjects seeking access to medical care. 
Although U.S. government agencies monitor clinical drug trials spon-
sored by American pharmaceutical companies, the scope of governmen-
tal authority is effectively limited to the companies’ domestic activities. In 
October 2008, restrictions on the FDA’s supervisory powers were further 
reinforced by the agency’s substitution of the ethical research principles 
found in the Declaration of Helsinki with other, less subject-oriented 
standards. This revision threatens the health and safety of clinical trial 
participants in the former Soviet Union, where the medical needs of the 
ailing poor prevent local governments from imposing substantial restric-
tions on Western pharmaceuticals manufacturers. This Comment criti-
cizes the practice of exploiting underprivileged populations for Western 
scientific progress, and argues that Congress must immediately respond 
to the FDA’s October 2008 resolution by acknowledging the Nuremberg 
Code as customary international law by which American pharmaceutical 
companies must abide. 
Introduction 
 As the life expectancy of the average American increases, a greater 
percentage of the U.S. population develops debilitating conditions, in-
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cluding heart disease, cancer, Alzheimer’s, and Type II diabetes.1 Ac-
cordingly, Americans have grown increasingly demanding of pharma-
ceutical companies, believing advances in medical research warrant 
better, less expensive drug therapies.2 The process of developing a new 
drug, however, is costly and slow—any prescription or over-the-counter 
drug must be approved for marketing and sale within the United States 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research (CDER).3 New drugs are approved on the 
basis of their efficacy and safety as determined by the results of time-
consuming and expensive three-phase human clinical trials.4 Strug-
gling to attain sufficiently large numbers of domestic drug trial partici-
pants, American pharmaceutical companies are increasingly turning to 
foreign populations for test subjects and research scientists.5 As a result, 
these companies have become key players in overseas medical re-
search.6
 Despite efforts to improve their image through corporate giving 
and public relations programs, American pharmaceutical companies 
are often maligned for putting profits before patients.7 Well-publicized 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 See Susan Brink, How Do Americans Die?, L.A. Times, Oct. 15, 2007, at F3; Center for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, Chronic Disease Overview, http://www.cdc.gov/NCCdphp/ 
overview.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
2 See Marcia Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies, N.Y. Rev. of Books, July 15, 
2004 at 52; Joe Stephens, The Body Hunters: Exporting Human Experiments; Where Profits and 
Lives Hang in Balance; Finding an Abundance of Subjects and Lack of Oversight Abroad, Big Drug 
Companies Test Offshore to Speed Products to Market, Wash. Post, Dec. 17, 2000, at A1. 
3 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, About Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/faq/default.htm#1 (last visited Apr. 14, 2009); 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, CDER New Drug Application Process, http://www. 
fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/NDA.htm#Introduction (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
4 See About Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, supra note 3; CDER New Drug 
Application Process, supra note 3. 
5 See Brian Finlay, Venture Capitalist.gov: Courting the Ultimate Angel Investor, American 
Venture, Jan. 2006, http://www.stimson.org/cnp/pdf/AmericanVentureCapitalist.FINAL. 
pdf; Adam H. Laughton, Note, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?: International Regulation 
of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 181, 181 (2007). 
6 See, e.g., State of Readiness for 2005-2006 Flu Season: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of 
Jesse L. Goodman, Director, Center for Biologics, Evaluation and Research, Department of 
Health and Human Services), available at http://www.fda.gov/ola/2005/influenza0504.html 
(explaining that concerns about the U.S. supply of influenza vaccines incited the FDA to 
“stimulate interested foreign-licensed manufacturers to provide or, where needed, develop 
the safety and effectiveness data required for U.S. licensure”). U.S. government agencies 
such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), for example, also play a monumental role 
in exporting clinical drug research. See id. 
7 See, e.g., Robert O’Harrow Jr., FDA Takes and End Run to Award Contract to PR Firm, 
Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1 (reporting the FDA’s attempt to hire Qorvis Communica-
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allegations of failures to warn of side effects associated with medica-
tions contribute to drug manufacturers’ negative image and sometimes 
result in costly pre-trial settlements.8 Not surprisingly, citizens of devel-
oping nations are attractive targets for clinical drug trials, because they 
are generally ill-informed about judgments against American pharma-
ceutical companies and lack the same degree of access to their coun-
tries’ courts.9 Furthermore, despite potential safety risks, government 
entities in underdeveloped nations are often reluctant to regulate their 
citizens’ participation in experimental drug trials because these trials 
are often perceived as the only method of obtaining otherwise unaf-
fordable medical treatment.10
 In recent years, countries of the former Soviet Union have at-
tracted the attention of Western pharmaceutical companies that previ-
ously focused their clinical trials in India and Africa.11 The former So-
                                                                                                                      
 
tions, an influential public relations group that has also done work for PhRMA, a trade 
group for pharmaceutical companies); PhRMA, Corporate Philanthropy, 
http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy_papers/pharmaceutical_companies_lead_the
_way_in_corporate_philanthropy (last visited Apr. 19, 2009) (praising the contributions of 
the pharmaceutical research industry to a range of international and domestic philan-
thropic efforts); Pfizer, Inc., Our Responsibility In a Changing World, 
http://www.pfizer.com/responsibility (last visited Apr. 29, 2009) (stating that Pfizer is 
“building partnerships in communities throughout the world to strengthen health systems, 
increase access to [its] medicines and find sustainable solutions to the health challenges of 
today, and tomorrow”); What’s Behind U.S. Drug Companies’ Response to the AIDS Crisis 
Abroad?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, Apr. 11, 2001, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn. 
edu/article.cfm?articleid=344 (maintaining that American pharmaceutical companies’ 
actions in Africa are motivated solely by the potential to profit). 
8 See Joel Slawotsky, International Product Liability Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 
16 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 157, 168 (2007); Eli Lilly Takes Charge for Zyprexa, L.A. Times, 
Oct. 22, 2008, at C2; Kevin McCoy, Merck Proposes $4.85 B Vioxx Settlement, USA Today, Nov. 
12, 2007, at 8A. 
9 See Sonia Shah, Globalizing Clinical Research: Big Pharma Tries Out First World Drugs on 
Unsuspecting Third World Parties, Nation, July 1, 2002, at 23. 
10 See Samantha Evans, The Globalization of Drug Testing: Enforcing Informed Consent Through 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, 19 Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 477, 477 (2005). The underprivileged, 
ailing poor tend to be unaware not only of their right to informed consent but of the very 
notion of such consent, which mandates that human research subjects must be “adequately 
informed of the risks and benefits of the trial, of their rights as participants, and their choice 
whether or not to participate.” See id. at 478. Wanting to provide healthcare for their citizens, 
governments of developing nations often turn a blind eye to the widespread abuse, injuries, 
and deaths that have resulted from the dangerous combination of poor people desperate for 
access to medicine and researchers’ desire to gather large pools of individuals to carry out 
clinical trials. See id. 
11 See Finnuala Kelleher, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for Protecting Human 
Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 67, 68–69 
(2004) (explaining that countries in Africa have large pools of prospective test subjects 
who both qualify and are eager to participate in drug trials); Indrajit Basu, India’s Clinical 
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viet Union offers many of the same opportunities for pharmaceutical 
companies that make India, a country nicknamed the “guinea pig of 
the world,” an attractive option.12 Namely, the former Soviet Union of-
fers pharmaceutical companies three advantages. First, the area offers 
an abundance of clinical test subjects—volunteers who, because of pov-
erty and poor health, are willing to gain access to healthcare by partici-
pating in risky trials without explanation of potential health conse-
quences.13 Second, the former Soviet Union is home to many highly 
trained civilian doctors willing to carry out clinical trials on their own 
countrymen—even to the point of exploitation—in exchange for the 
steady, competitive salaries offered by American pharmaceutical com-
panies.14 Third, the centralized hospital system found in many former 
Soviet republics facilitates the process of recruiting clinical trial partici-
pants, further lowering costs for American pharmaceutical companies 
conducting trials there.15
 Regardless of whether a clinical research study is performed in a 
developed or developing nation, the benefits of such research can only 
be achieved with negative tradeoffs, usually in the form of health risks 
to clinical trial participants.16 Compounding these patients’ vulnerabil-
ity in the former Soviet Union is the lack of the strict regulations that, 
in Western nations, direct clinical drug researchers to comply with 
                                                                                                                      
Trials and Tribulations, Asia Times Online, July 23, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ 
South_Asia/FG23Df03.html (predicting that clinical drug trials sponsored by foreign 
companies would increase in the years to come and calling for increased safety measures). 
12 See generally Jennifer Kahn, India: A Nation of Guinea Pigs, Wired Magazine, Mar. 1, 
2006, at 142 (identifying India as the “global hot spot” for foreign pharmaceutical compa-
nies’ drug trials); Shah, supra note 9 (highlighting the risks inherent in drug trial participa-
tion for underprivileged populations and identifying Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
Southeast Asia as places of increasing interest to American pharmaceutical companies); Bur-
den of Disease Weighs on Population, Bus. Monitor Int’l., Ltd., June 2008, available at http:// 
www.pharmaceuticalsinsight.com/file/65387/burden-of-disease-weighs-on-population.html 
(explaining why Russians comprise the most disease-burdened population in Europe); CROs 
Look to Emerging Europe to Cut Costs, Bus. Monitor Int’l., Ltd., June 2006, available at http:// 
www.pharmaceuticalsinsight.com/file/33327/cros-look-to-emerging-europe-to-cut-costs.html 
(identifying emerging markets for pharmaceutical testing in Eastern Europe). 
13 See Abrahm Lustgarten, Drug Testing Goes Offshore, Fortune, Aug. 8, 2005, at 67, 69–
70. 
14 See id. at 68 (discussing the advantages to foreign pharmaceutical companies of Rus-
sia’s centralized hospital system); Burden of Disease Weighs on Population, supra note 12; CROs 
Look to Emerging Europe to Cut Costs, supra note 12. 
15 See Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 68. 
16 See James Cekola, Outsourcing Drug Investigations to India: A Comment on U.S., Indian 
and International Regulation of Clinical Trials in Cross-Border Pharmaceutical Research, 28 Nw. J. 
Int’l L. & Bus. 125, 126 (2007). 
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ethical standards during the course of their research.17 As in other 
countries where underprivileged populations serve as clinical trial par-
ticipants, tension has developed between the twin aims of thoroughly 
vetting new drugs and the importance of protecting subjects’ health 
and safety.18
 A principal ethical concern arising from these conflicting objec-
tives is the question of distributive justice—the equitable distribution of 
the risks and benefits arising from using underprivileged test subjects in 
Western pharmaceutical research.19 Despite known instances of abuse 
of test populations in these countries, the dearth of lawsuits by test sub-
jects against pharmaceutical manufacturers and the researchers they 
employ suggests that underprivileged clinical test subjects in the former 
Soviet Union lack access to the justice system when the research process 
proves harmful.20 Moreover, mere access to the courts is an insufficient 
guarantor of justice for international test subjects.21 Even if clinical trial 
subjects in the former Soviet Union were to file suit—domestically, or 
in the United States—against American pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
such plaintiffs would have very little chance of success because of the 
absence of positive law granting specific court jurisdiction over such 
cases.22
                                                                                                                      
 
17 See Sharon LaFraniere et al., The Body Hunters: Failure of Consent; The Dilemma: Submit 
or Suffer; “Uninformed Consent” Is Rising Ethic of the Drug Test Boom, Wash. Post, Dec. 19, 
2000, at A1. 
18 See Laughton, supra note 5, at 191. 
19 See Jolyon Ford & George Tomossy, Clinical Trials in Developing Countries: The Plain-
tiff’s Challenge, 2004 L. Soc. Just. & Global Dev. J., http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/ 
law/elj/lgd/2004_1/ford. 
20 See 3 Doctors Charged in Vaccine Scandal, Moscow Times, Apr. 3, 2007, at 1. Although 
the former Soviet Union is notorious for keeping its own failures from the public eye, a 
tragic incident involving the severe illness of Russian infants was reported by The Moscow 
Times in April 2007. See id. After doctors at Independent Clinical Hospital included chil-
dren with neurological disorders and chronic illnesses in a vaccine trial for British phar-
maceutical company GlaxoSmithKlein, prosecutors in Volgograd began a criminal investi-
gation of the pharmaceutical company. Id. They discovered that GlaxoSmithKlein paid two 
of the three hospital directors approximately $84,000 in order to gain access to over 100 
children between the ages of one and two. See id.; Andrew Osborn, GSK at Centre of Russian 
Vaccine Scandal, Indep. (London), Apr. 4, 2007, at 36. Such drug trials are illegal in Russia 
because the subjects were minors; furthermore, the parents of the children included 
in the study did not consent to their children’s participation. See Osborn, supra. 
21 See Ford & Tomossy, supra note 19. 
22 See id. Furthermore, the Alien Tort Statute, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, and stating in relevant part that, “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States,” fails to provide potential plaintiffs with a cause of action be-
cause it provides redress only where there is a violation of established international law 
recognized as such at the time of the statute’s enactment. See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 
430 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 29:425 
 Just as in India and Africa, the safety challenges presented by hu-
man experimentation in the former Soviet Union show a need for 
regulating human clinical trials and for balancing scientific progress 
with the protection of test subjects.23 This Comment posits that human 
rights violations perpetrated by American pharmaceutical companies 
conducting clinical drug trials in the former Soviet Union—a region 
largely overlooked in existing legal literature—are likely to escape judi-
cial scrutiny. This Comment assesses the potential for existing interna-
tional customary law to provide a set of comprehensive standards that 
would apply to these trials. Part I introduces the FDA’s drug approval 
process and examines the primary advantages gained by Western 
pharmaceutical companies who conduct clinical drug trials abroad. 
Part II highlights the failure of Contract Research Organizations 
(CROs), American pharmaceutical companies themselves, and U.S. 
regulatory agencies to provide for the health and safety of clinical test 
subjects. Part III examines the ethical debate over exporting pharma-
ceutical testing to the former Soviet Union as well as the role of CROs 
in the trial export process. Part IV presents and analyzes two sets of in-
ternational guidelines that attempt to set standards for ethical experi-
mentation on humans. The analysis in Part IV concludes that the FDA’s 
October 2008 rejection of certain principles espoused by the Declara-
tion of Helsinki leaves foreign clinical trial participants more vulner-
able than ever before to ethical violations. Part V argues that the Nur-
emberg Code, an international code of ethics, should be recognized in 
the United States as customary international law applicable to Ameri-
can pharmaceutical manufacturers in their research and development 
process, regardless of whether the companies conduct their clinical tri-
als in the United States or abroad. 
I. Defining the Problem 
 References to “Big Pharma” are well-deserved, as the American 
pharmaceutical industry has been the most consistently profitable sec-
tor of the economy since World War II.24 Before a pharmaceutical 
                                                                                                                      
 
U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: Globalizing Ethical Standards in Drug 
Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 877, 903–04 (2008). 
23 See Cekola, supra note 16, at 126. 
24 See George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal, and Self-Deception in Post-
modern Medical Research, in Health and Human Rights 312, 324 ( Jonathan M. Mann et al. 
eds., 1999); Laughton, supra note 5, at 189; Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reps. 
Global Biotech Sales Grew 12.5 Percent in 2007, Exceeding $75 Billion ( Jun. 17, 2008), 
http://www.imshealth.com (follow “Press Room” hyperlink; then follow “News Releases” 
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company can market a drug in the United States, the drug must obtain 
FDA approval.25 The approval process, overseen by the FDA’s Center 
for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), ensures that new drugs are 
safe and effective.26 To obtain CDER approval, a drug must undergo 
three phases of clinical trials as well as institutional review by the 
CDER.27 As each clinical investigation proceeds, progressively more 
clinical test subjects are required for each phase.28 A phase III clinical 
trial can involve up to 3000 test subjects.29 Large numbers of volunteers 
                                                                                                                      
 
hyperlink; then follow “IMS Health Reps. Global Biotech Sales Grew 12.5 Percent in 2007, 
Exceeding $75 Billion” hyperlink) [hereinafter IMS Press Release]. In 2007, the global 
pharmaceutical market increased 6.4%, and global prescription sales of biotech drugs, 
representing twenty five percent of the total pharmaceutical pipeline, increased 12.5% to 
more than seventy-five billion dollars. See IMS Press Release, supra. 
25 See The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); Jennifer J. Couture, 
The Changes in Informed Consent in Experimental Procedures: The Evolution of a Concept, 1 J. 
Health & Biomed. L. 125,135 (2004). The Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act requires that 
drugs be safe for their intended use. See 21 U.S.C. § 355. Not surprisingly, the costs of re-
search and development serve as a hefty counterweight to pharmaceutical companies’ 
revenues. See Jim Love & Tim Hubbard, Comment, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for 
New Medicines, 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1519, 1520–23 (2007) (criticizing pharmaceutical 
companies’ wasteful spending in research and development processes and suggesting that 
the cost of patented brand name drugs is tolerated only because it is necessary for the 
stimulation of research and development of new medicine). Pharmaceutical companies’ 
annual spending is so high in part because the cost of developing a drug over ten to fif-
teen years can range from $800 million to $1.5 billion, a cost that only three out of every 
ten marketed drugs recoup through sales revenues. See Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America, Pharmaceutical Industry Profile 2007, at 5–6 (2007), 
available at http://www.phrma.org/files/Profile%202007.pdf; Cekola, supra note 16, at 
125; H. Grabowski et al., Return on Research and Development for 1990s New Drug Introductions, 
20 Pharmacoeconomics Supp. 3, 11–29 (2002). 
26 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Frequently Asked Questions to CDER, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/faq/default.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter 
CDER FAQ]. 
27 See id.; ClinicalTrials.gov, Understanding Clinical Trials, http://www.clinicaltrials. 
gov/ct2/info/understand (last visited Apr. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Understanding Clinical 
Trials]. A fourth phase of clinical trials involves post-marketing studies that may reveal 
additional information regarding a drug’s risks, benefits and optimal use. See Understand-
ing Clinical Trials, supra; see also Richard E. Ashcroft & A.M. Viens, Clinical Trials, in The 
Cambridge Textbook of Bioethics 202 (Peter A. Singer & A.M. Viens eds., 2008) (ex-
plaining that this “postmarketing surveillance phase” may also entail studies of the effect 
of different dosages, schedules, and length of drug administration on patients’ reactions to 
newly-developed drugs). 
28 See Understanding Clinical Trials, supra note 27. 
29 See CDER FAQ, supra note 26; Understanding Clinical Trials, supra note 27. At each 
phase, scientists learn the answers to different questions. See Understanding Clinical Trials, 
supra note 27. In Phase I trials, researchers conduct the first-ever test of the experimental 
drug or treatment on a small group of study participants (twenty to eighty people) to 
evaluate drug safety, determine a safe dosage range, and identify side effects. See id. In 
Phase II trials, the experimental drug or treatment is given to a larger group of study par-
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are gathered to ensure that a sufficient number of participants will 
both meet a trial’s eligibility requirements and successfully comply with 
the prescribed protocol.30 The federal government requires that before 
a pharmaceutical manufacturer may begin a clinical trial on a newly-
developed drug or treatment, the trial must be approved by an Institu-
tional Review Board (IRB) to ensure it is ethical and that the risks are 
as low as possible and worth the potential benefits.31
 Pharmaceutical manufacturers have found Americans increasingly 
hesitant to participate in drug experiments because of skepticism about 
their safety.32 In accordance with the position taken by the American 
Civil Liberties Union and other organizations advocating the need for 
patients’ informed consent, the FDA requires that clinical test partici-
pants be willing volunteers, and federal regulation prohibits the testing 
of drugs in development on non-volunteer populations.33 These gov-
                                                                                                                      
 
ticipants (100 to 300 people) to ensure efficacy and evaluate safety. See id. Phase III is used 
to confirm the experimental drug or treatment’s effectiveness, collect further safety-
related information, and to make comparisons to other commonly used drugs or treat-
ments. See id. 
30 See Sonia Shah, The Body Hunters 3 (2006). 
31 See Understanding Clinical Trials, supra note 27. IRBs are comprised of independent 
committees of physicians, statisticians, community advocates and others and are responsi-
ble for the initial approval and periodic review of research results. Id. An IRB may be “any 
board, committee, or other group formally designated by an institution to review, to ap-
prove the initiation of, and to conduct periodic review of, biomedical research involving 
human subjects.” Id. The primary purpose of such review is to assure the “protection of the 
rights and welfare of the human subjects.” See Cekola, supra note 16, at 132 (quoting 21 
C.F.R. § 56.102(g) (2005)). 
32 See Shah, supra note 30, at 4–5. Shah notes that fewer than one in twenty Americans 
are willing to participate in clinical trials and that less than four percent of cancer patients 
would participate in a new cancer drug trial. Id. 
33 See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2009). In an attempt to ensure the informed consent of clini-
cal trial participants, the FDA set forth guidelines codified as General Requirements for 
Informed Consent in 21 C.F.R. Section 50.20. See id. The preface to these requirements 
states that human subjects may only participate in clinical investigations if the investigator 
has received their informed consent and requires that written notification provide pro-
spective trial participants sufficient opportunity to decide whether or not to participate in 
the study without coercion or undue influence. See id. Although the General Requirements 
for Informed Consent provide that the information given to the subject shall be in lan-
guage understandable to the subject or his or her representative, these regulations were 
enacted specifically to protect U.S. citizens from potential harms associated with experi-
mental or untested treatment, and they make no mention of their applicability to human 
test subjects outside of the United States. See id.; Couture, supra note 25, at 133–34. Further 
suggesting that these requirements were intended only to apply within the United States is 
the understanding that the standard for “understandable language” is a fourth grade read-
ing level. See Couture, supra note 25, at 138 n.62. The United States may have been tar-
geted because of its unfortunate history of ethical violations in clinical trials. Perhaps the 
most notorious U.S.-based trial is the United States Public Health Service Syphilis Study, a 
2009] Pharmaceutical Drug Testing in the Former Soviet Union 433 
ernment-imposed restrictions and the difficulty drug companies have 
had in recruiting domestic volunteers contributed to the backup in the 
“pipeline” of developing drugs.34 An industry study in 2000 estimated 
that a single day’s delay in getting a major drug to market can cost a 
pharmaceutical company $1.3 million in unrealized sales.35 Pressure 
from shareholders to turn a profit and the large number of test subjects 
needed for every drug trial combine to foster intense competition be-
tween drug manufacturers for test subjects.36 As a result of these trends, 
pharmaceutical companies are bypassing academic medical centers and 
utilizing Contract Research Organizations (CROs)—independent con-
tractors who are able to perform clinical trials more quickly than 
pharmaceutical or biotech companies.37
 CROs, as for-profit companies, are more aggressive and efficient in 
finding patients and carrying out clinical trials.38 CROs may even be 
responsible for inciting many Western pharmaceutical giants to hold 
                                                                                                                      
medical experiment that took place from 1932 until 1972 in Tuskegee, Alabama in which 
medical researchers working for the U.S. government withheld readily available medical 
treatment from poor black men. See Khan, supra note 22 at 883. Less well-known is the fact 
that clinical drug trials were performed on the U.S. prison population until ethical re-
forms incited Congress to outlaw the practice in the 1970s. See Shah, supra note 30, at 6; 
Khan, supra note 22, at 883. 
34 See Shah, supra note 30, at 3. 
35 See Mary Pat Flaherty et al., The Body Hunters: Testing Tidal Wave Hits Overseas, Wash. 
Post, Dec. 18, 2000, at A1. 
36 See id. 
37 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2008) (“Contract research organization means a person 
that assumes, as an independent contractor with the sponsor, one or more of the obliga-
tions of a sponsor, e.g., design of a protocol, selection or monitoring of investigations, 
evaluation of reports, and preparation of materials to be submitted to the Food and Drug 
Administration”); Shah, supra note 30 at 6; Ken Gatter, Fixing Cracks: A Discourse Norm to 
Repair the Crumbling Regulatory Structure Supporting Clinical Research and Protecting Human 
Subjects, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 581, 618 (2005). 
38 See Shah, supra note 30, at 6–7; Miriam Shuchman, Commercializing Clinical Trials—
Risks and Benefits of the CRO Boom, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 1365, 1365 (2007); Emilie Reymond, 
CRO Supremacy in Clinical Research Raises Concerns, Outsourcing-Pharma.com, Oct. 3, 2007, 
http://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Clinical-Development/CRO-supremacy-in-clinical-
research-raises-concerns. CRO industry revenues grew from around seven billion dollars in 
2001 to about $17.8 billion in 2007, and there are currently over 1000 CROs. See Reymond, 
supra. Among the most profitable, Quintiles, Covance, Pharmaceutical Product Development  
and Charles River Laboratories are billion dollar companies, with runners-up Parexel and 
MDS Pharma Services worth over $500 million each. See Shuchman, supra, at 1365. Accord-
ing to CenterWatch, a Boston-based information services company focusing on the clinical 
trials industry, CROs played a “substantial role” in sixty-four percent of Phase I, II and III 
clinical trials in 2003, as compared to only twenty-eight percent in 1993, and a study con-
ducted by the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development found that ten of the largest 
firms had enrolled over 640,000 subjects in trials in 2004. See id. 
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more clinical trials overseas.39 This is because in addition to finding 
drug trial participants, CROs provide “local expertise and regulatory 
experience” and recruit the very doctors who perform the trials.40 
Clinical trials that move abroad are generally held in poor countries 
with large ailing populations; in other words, developing countries 
where “ethical standards may be lax and the impoverished sick abun-
dant.”41 Countries that match this description include India and others 
in Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America, where the importation of 
clinical trials from overseas has resulted in an increase in the number 
of clinical investigators.42
 From a regulatory and an ethical perspective, the danger inherent 
in outsourcing drug trials overseas is the threat it poses to the health 
and safety of human test subjects.43 Although clinical research trials 
managed by CROs for American pharmaceutical companies are subject 
to FDA regulation, these regulations can be circumvented more easily 
when trials are conducted abroad, exposing clinical trial participants to 
unnecessary health and safety risks as new drugs are “speeded” to the 
market.44 Furthermore, as CROs do not conduct clinical trials within 
“the norms and restrictions” of an academic institution’s research set-
ting, there is an increased chance of conflict between the duty of the 
clinician to ensure his patients’ safety and the profitability of the CRO, 
the clinician himself, and the pharmaceutical company sponsoring the 
trial.45 Not surprisingly, governments wishing to attract drug companies 
                                                                                                                      
 
39 See Shah, supra note 30, at 6–7. 
40 See Finlay supra note 5; Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 70–72. 
41 See Sonia Shah, Globalization of Clinical Research by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 33 
Int’l. J. Health Serv. 29, 29 (2003). 
42 See Shah, supra note 30, at xi, 7; Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 69. Between 2001 and 
2003, the number of U.S. clinical investigators decreased by eleven percent, simultane-
ously, the number of overseas clinical investigators went up eight percent. Shah, supra 
note 30, at xi. 
43 See Gatter, supra note 37, at 618. 
44 See id.; Robert Gatter, Conflicts of Interest in International Human Drug Research and the 
Insufficiency of International Protections, 32 Am. J. L. & Med. 351, 351 (2006). 
45 See Gatter, supra note 37 at 618–21; Gatter, supra note 44, at 351–52. Robert Gatter 
explains that many of the physicians conducting research for pharmaceutical companies, 
as well as the research institutions where the research takes place, have a financial interest 
in studies’ outcomes. See Gatter, supra note 44, at 351–52. The researchers and their institu-
tions sometimes own equity in the pharmaceutical companies they work for, but more 
commonly, researchers and institutions enter into licensing agreements with pharmaceuti-
cal companies over scientific discoveries. See id. In either case, researchers and their insti-
tutions benefit when a drug goes to market faster; the value of equity holdings and reve-
nues from licensing agreements goes up, and the drug companies’ success goes partially 
towards funding the operating costs of the researchers’ institutions. See id. Clinical trial 
participants therefore risk abuse at the hands of researchers who, having a financial inter-
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to conduct clinical trials within their borders have strong incentives to 
encourage leniency in national and local oversight of the research.46 
Finally, lack of uniformity in U.S. government regulation of American 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ conduct across international and do-
mestic clinical trial sites encourages these companies to export clinical 
trials abroad purely to escape the more stringent safety requirements 
imposed on experiments conducted on U.S. soil.47
II. Current Regulations and Practices Affecting Clinical 
Research Outsourcing 
 The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)’s 
Office of Inspector General recognized the regulatory challenges posed 
by international clinical drug research as early as 2001, when it released 
a report that identified the former Soviet Union as one of several 
emerging markets for clinical drug trials.48 The report found that al-
though the FDA in 2001 oversaw significantly more foreign drug re-
search than it had a decade earlier, investigators who had not been in-
spected by the agency conducted a large portion of the international 
drug research.49 Much of this research took place in countries where 
neither the local IRBs nor the boards’ host countries supplied informa-
tion about the review boards’ performance and where the FDA had 
inadequate data regarding the parties conducting clinical drug re-
search.50 The report also found that ethics committees responsible for 
ensuring human subject safety in overseas trials were too disorganized 
to sufficiently fulfill their obligations.51 The report set forth specific 
recommendations for the FDA as well as for the Office for Human Re-
                                                                                                                      
est in conducting quick, successful trials, may enroll subjects who do not meet the clinical 
criteria for participation or even “underestimate the importance of a subject’s adverse 
reaction to participation.” See id. 
46 See Gatter, supra note 44, at 351–52. 
47 See Molly McGregor, Note, Uninformed Consent: The United Nations’ Failure to Appropri-
ately Police Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 31 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 103, 120 
(2007). Although McGregor specifically focuses on the lack of informed consent by trial 
subjects, her Note suggests, as does this Comment, that the cause of this problem “lies in 
the failure to achieve a uniform application of the procedure.” See id. 
48 See Janet Rehnquist, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., The Globaliza-
tion of Clinical Trials: A Growing Challenge in Protecting Human Subjects 
(2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-00-00190.pdf. 
49 See id. at i. 
50 See id. at ii. 
51 See Gatter, supra note 44, at 353. 
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search Protections, with the goal of protecting the health and safety 
interests of human participants in non-U.S. drug trials.52
 Not surprisingly, the benefits to Western pharmaceutical coffers do 
not come without costs—namely health and safety risks—to their hu-
man test subjects.53 Today, the greatest obstacle to ensuring the health 
and safety of participants in overseas trials may be the lack of regulation 
over the CROs employed by Western pharmaceutical manufacturers.54 
Developing, unstable countries are generally ill-equipped to oversee, 
much less manage, the clinical trials being held within their borders. 
Because there is no positive international law mandating CRO compli-
ance with the relevant domestic laws of the clinical studies’ sponsors, 
the resulting “regulatory vacuum” makes it difficult for these countries 
to ensure the welfare of trial participants and forces them to rely on 
foreign data and foreign review processes.55
 American pharmaceutical companies find U.S. government sup-
port for clinical outsourcing efforts in the broad wording of relevant 
government regulations.56 Specifically, the U.S. regulatory scheme al-
lows pharmaceutical companies to submit drugs for FDA approval pur-
suant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act even if a company’s clinical 
trial data are based exclusively on the results of foreign trials as long as: 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Rehnquist, supra note 48 at ii–iii. Other recommendations by bioethics commit-
tees have been aimed directly at companies conducting biomedical research. See Remigius 
N. Nwabueze, Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Subjects in Nigeria: Legal and Policy 
Issues, 14 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 87, 88 (2003). Two entities that have issued “copious 
recommendations” in response to the globalization of biomedical research are Britain’s 
Nuffield Council of Bioethics and the United States’ National Bioethics Advisory Commit-
tee. See id. 
53 See Sarah Bahir, An International Legal System Regulating the Trade in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector and Services Provided by Human Subjects, 6 Asper Rev. Int’l Bus. & Trade L. 157, 163 
(2006). Regarding the trade-offs made when U.S. companies export clinical trials, Bahir 
explains that “[t]he benefit to pharmaceutical companies is invaluable. Not only do they 
get access to a ready pool of patients unavailable elsewhere, they also reduce research 
costs. In return for their services, research participants receive sub-standard care, unethi-
cal treatment, and unequal opportunity to benefit from prospective treatment.” See id. 
54 See Rehnquist, supra note 48 at 8–15. See generally Ford & Tomossy, supra note 19 
(discussing the factors a litigant may consider when bringing a lawsuit abroad rather than 
in the country where the clinical trial took place, but also noting the perceived corrupt-
ness of foreign tribunals). Ford and Tomossy report that in 2001, the U.S. National Bio-
ethics Advisory Commission recommended that in the absence of an established system of 
clinical trials governance, trials should be approved by ethics committees in the host coun-
try and by an American Institutional Review Board. See Ford & Tomossy, supra note 19. 
55 See Ford & Tomossy, supra note 19. 
56 See Cekola, supra note 16, at 131. 
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(1) The foreign data are applicable to the U.S. population 
and U.S. medical practice; 
(2) [T]he studies have been performed by clinical investiga-
tors of recognized competence; and 
(3) [T]he data may be considered valid without the need for 
an on-site inspection by FDA or, if FDA considers such an in-
spection to be necessary, FDA is able to validate the data 
through an on-site inspection or other appropriate means.57
This same regulation—21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)—highlights the FDA’s 
power to self-regulate in stating that the “FDA will apply this policy in a 
flexible manner according to the nature of the drug and the data being 
considered.”58
 Perhaps the most important regulation pertaining to human trials 
conducted both within and outside the United States to date is the 
DHHS policy for the protection of human subjects, referred to as the 
Common Rule because it binds fifteen agencies in addition to DHHS.59 
Although the Common Rule explicitly states that research subject to 
regulation as defined in Section 46.102(e) that is neither conducted nor 
supported by a federal department or agency must nevertheless be re-
viewed and approved by an institutional review board (IRB), exceptions 
provided in the Common Rule, Sections 46.101(h) and (i), and the lack 
of oversight of clinical trials in developing countries limit the effective-
ness of this administrative law.60 Developing countries often lack formal 
                                                                                                                      
 
57 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)(2009). 
58 See id. 
59 See Markus Schott, Medical Research on Humans: Regulation in Switzerland, the European 
Union and the United States, 60 Food Drug L.J. 45, 65 (2005). The policy applies to all re-
search “involving human subjects conducted, supported or otherwise subject to regulation 
by any federal department or agency which takes appropriate administrative action to 
make the policy applicable to such research. . . . It also includes research conducted, sup-
ported, or otherwise subject to regulation by the federal government outside the United 
States.” See The Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 46 Subpart A (2009). 
60 See The Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. 46.101(a)(2). The Common Rule, § 46.102(e) 
states: “Research subject to regulation . . . does not include research activities which are 
incidentally regulated by a federal department or agency solely as part of the department’s 
or agency’s broader responsibility to regulate certain types of activities whether research or 
non-research in nature.” See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(e). The Common Rule, § 46.101(h) states: 
“When research covered by this policy takes place in foreign countries, procedures nor-
mally followed in the foreign countries to protect human subjects may differ from those 
set forth in this policy . . . In these circumstances, if a department or agency head deter-
mines that the procedures prescribed by the institution afford protections that are at least 
equivalent to those provided in this policy, the department or agency head may approve 
the substitution of the foreign procedures in lieu of the procedural requirements provided 
in this policy.” See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(h) (2009). The Common Rule, § 46.101(i) states: 
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and systematic guidelines for the safe conduct of research on humans, 
but Section 46.101(h) of the Common Rule might cause the FDA to 
overlook a pharmaceutical company’s abuse if the agency determines a 
developing country’s drug trial standards to be equivalent with U.S. 
ones and agency heads substitute foreign procedures for the U.S. re-
quirements.61 Likewise, Section 46.101(i) of the Common Rule allows 
department and agency heads to waive the applicability of some or all of 
the safety provisions of the Code because compliance with the Common 
Rule is not required of U.S.-based entities such as pharmaceutical com-
panies who conduct “purely private” research.62 The differences be-
tween the procedures used to protect drug trial subjects in the United 
States and those abroad suggest that under the FDA regulations, the 
protection of human subjects, and specifically foreign subjects, is only a 
“supplemental” government interest.63
 In an effort to harmonize the Code of Federal Regulations with 
other international standards for human clinical trials, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) publishes guidelines known collectively as 
Good Clinical Research Practice (“GCP”) to meet some of the regula-
tory challenges of international clinical drug testing.64 The GCP Guide-
lines recommend that CROs establish local review boards, obtain the 
                                                                                                                      
“Unless otherwise required by law, department or agency heads may waive the applicability 
of some or all of the provisions of this policy to specific research activities or classes of 
research activities otherwise covered by this policy.” See id. § 46.101(i) (2009). 
61 See Nwabueze, supra note 52, at 110–11. Until October of 2008, a U.S.-based phar-
maceutical company employing a CRO to conduct research trials outside the United States 
needed only to comply with the stricter of the host country’s national requirements or the 
Declaration of Helsinki’s requirement of Institutional Review Board (IRB) monitoring and 
approval of trials (discussed infra). See Kelleher, supra note 11, at 84–85. However, the IRB 
monitoring required by the Declaration of Helsinki has been accused of being a “rubber 
stamp” process—were a pharmaceutical company to choose to have its CRO comply with a 
host country’s national requirements, the FDA would be unable to verify the compliance 
due to a lack of power and resources. See id. at 85. 
62 See The Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(i); Schott, supra note 59, at 65. 
63 See William DuBois, Note, New Drug Research, The Extraterritorial Application of FDA 
Regulations, and the Need for International Cooperation, 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 161, 193 
(2003). In late 2007, the FDA Science Board identified the growing disparity between the 
agency’s many domestic responsibilities and its limited resources as a possible explanation 
for the FDA’s shortcomings. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Science and 
Mission at Risk—Report on the Subcommittee on Science and Technology (2007), 
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_00_index.html (fol-
low “FDA Report on Science and Technology” hyperlink). Hurdles the FDA faces include 
challenges in recruiting and retaining scientific capability, inadequate information tech-
nology infrastructure, and insufficient modeling, risk assessment and analysis capabilities. 
See id. 
64 See Gatter, supra note 44, at 357–58; Kelleher, supra note 11, at 75–76. 
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permission of government health ministries to pre-approve trials, coun-
sel researchers against accepting excessive payments from drug manu-
facturers, and offer procedures for obtaining the informed consent of 
study participants.65 Although the WHO and other organizations advo-
cate the tailoring of GCP provisions so that they sufficiently address 
specific conditions in individual countries, the merely advisory guide-
lines have not proven sufficient to prevent violations and abuses in 
clinical research taking place in developing nations.66 As thousands of 
test subjects are enrolled in clinical drug trials in the former Soviet Un-
ion, India, Africa, China, Latin America, and elsewhere, researchers 
and doctors are reporting failures in compliance with ethical stan-
dards.67 Without positive law governing clinical trials abroad, CROs 
have little incentive to regulate unethical or exploitative behavior by 
researchers.68 The result is an increased risk that the rapid testing and 
approval inherent in international pharmaceutical-product collabora-
tion will negatively affect countries that host the overseas clinical trials 
of Western companies.69
III. The Emergence of the Former Soviet Union as Western 
Pharma’s New Laboratory 
A. The Indian Model 
 Much has been written in recent years about the increase in out-
sourcing of clinical drug trials to India and the business strategy behind 
                                                                                                                      
65 See Gatter, supra note 44, at 356–57; Kelleher, supra note 11, at 75–76; Lustgarten, 
supra note 13, at 72. 
66 See Ford & Tomossy, supra note 19. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human 
Servs., Guidelines for Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects at the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (2004), available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/ 
GrayBooklet82404.pdf; World Health Organization, Handbook for Good Clinical 
Research Practice (GCP) (2005), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_ 
safety/safety_efficacy/OMS-GCP.pdf. Organizations advocating the tailoring of GCP provi-
sions include the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, the Council 
of Europe, and the National Institutes of Health, among others. See Ford & Tomossy, supra 
note 19. Unfortunately, the situation is unlikely to improve without government interven-
tion. See generally LaFraniere et al., supra note 17. Molly McGregor also astutely points out 
that WHO’s primary method of policy and guideline implementation is the Internet, a 
resource incapable of preventing unscrupulous pharmaceutical companies from conduct-
ing risky experimental procedures in countries where the need to secure medical aid over-
comes general awareness of well-meaning guidelines. See McGregor, supra note 47, at 123–
24. 
67 See Shah, supra note 30, at 7; LaFraniere et al., supra note 17. 
68 See Laughton, supra note 5, at 191. 
69 See id. 
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the trials’ export.70 Already a favorite outsourcing destination for soft-
ware development, customer service and technology call centers, India 
has positioned itself to become a “global hotspot” of clinical trial out-
sourcing while simultaneously ensuring that it captures a portion of the 
value it adds to foreign companies’ global research and development 
models.71 Regulatory maneuverings by the Indian government further 
enhance the country’s attractiveness as a destination for Western clini-
cal drug trials.72
 The second most populous country in the world after China, India 
has a large, diverse, underprivileged and drug-naïve patient population 
that offers easy recruitment of willing clinical trial participants who 
perceive the chance to participate in a drug trial as a “healthcare wind-
fall.”73 The country’s inadequate healthcare infrastructure, low operat-
ing costs for Western pharmaceutical companies, and established clini-
cal research organizations also contribute to making India an attractive 
destination for clinical trial outsourcing.74 Scholars are concerned 
about the Indian government’s ability to enforce its own regulations 
and oversee local ethics committees, as well as the quality of the in-
formed consent given by researchers to trial participants.75 Simultane-
ously, critics fear that these tactics offer an example to countries in the 
former Soviet Union of how the government of an impoverished peo-
ple may seek new opportunities by acquiescing to the pressures of mul-
tinational drug companies and other private organizations.76
                                                                                                                      
70 See, e.g., Samiran Nundy & Chandra M. Gulhati, A New Colonialism?–Conducting Clini-
cal Trials in India, 325 N. Eng. J. Med. 1633, 1634 (2005) (reporting that U.S. pharmaceu-
tical companies stand to save up to sixty percent on the cost of drug trials by outsourcing 
them to India). 
71 See Cekola, supra note 16, at 126. 
72 See id. at 129–30, 145. 
73 See id. at 129. 
74 See id. 
75 See Cekola, supra note 16, at 145; Nundy & Gulhati, supra note 70, at 1634. 
76 See Nundy & Gulhati, supra note 70, at 1634–35. On the regulatory front, the Indian 
government amended its Patent Act in 2005, allowing foreign companies to patent phar-
maceutical products there for the first time. See id. A second significant regulatory move 
was India’s 2005 amendment to the country’s Drugs and Cosmetics Rules to eliminate the 
requirement of a “phase lag” —a demand that pharmaceuticals test products in Phase III 
outside of India before testing them within India for Phase II trials. See id. at 1633–34. By 
embracing foreign pharmaceutical companies, India’s government earns compensation 
for its hospitals and doctors-turned-researchers. See id. at 1634; Cekoka, supra note 16, at 
126. 
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B. Western Big Pharma’s Abuse of the Former Soviet Union: The Argument 
Against Outsourcing Clinical Trials 
 Proponents of Western drug manufacturers’ clinical trials in Russia 
and the former Soviet Union cite savings in the cost and time required 
for FDA approval as two major advantages to international trials.77 An 
emerging market for clinical trial outsourcing, Russia recently came 
third after China and India in a global list of the most attractive low–
cost locations to run clinical trials outside the United States.78 Fortune 
Magazine reported in 2005 that American-based Pfizer Corporation 
conducts trials in the former Soviet Union to cut three to six months 
off the time it takes to get a drug to market.79 Overseas trials in Eastern 
Europe as a whole are cheaper to conduct as well—in 2005, running a 
drug trial in the United States cost GlaxoSmithKline about $30,000 per 
patient—in Romania, the cost was $3,000.80 The combination of speed 
and low cost are increasing the popularity of conducting clinical trials 
abroad: Jean-Paul Garnier, CEO of GlaxoSmithKline, referred to glob-
alization as “the ultimate arbitrage” for companies like his, reporting in 
2005 that a third of his company’s trials were taking place in low–cost 
countries and that his aim was to reach a fifty percent outsourcing rate 
by 2007.81
 Russia’s centralized hospital system contributes to the pace at 
which clinical trial subjects are recruited.82 A centralized healthcare 
system means that patients are conveniently hospitalized together ac-
cording to symptoms and conditions, facilitating the process by which 
drug trial administrators identify and engage patients meeting the 
qualifications of their research studies.83 Hospitals in the former Soviet 
                                                                                                                      
 
77 See Kristy Barnes, Hesperion Turns to Russia to Conduct Clinical Drug Trials, Outsourcing-
Pharma.com, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Clinical-Development/ 
Hesperion-turns-to-Russia-to-tackle-large-trials. 
78 See id. 
79 See Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 69. 
80 See id. The former Soviet Union presents significant cost saving opportunities to for-
eign pharmaceutical companies largely because they are able to conduct clinical trials 
there earlier in the drug development cycle. See id. Striking examples of this were reported 
in the media as early as 2000, when the Washington Post reported that California-based 
Maxim Pharmaceuticals Inc. was barred from testing a new drug on Americans with liver 
disease until further animal testing was completed, but the company tested in Russia in-
stead and avoided a delay that could have cost millions of dollars. See Flaherty et al., supra 
note 35. 
81 See Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 69. 
82 See id. at 87. 
83 See Rehnquist, supra note 48, at 8; Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 87. The 2001 In-
spector General report notes a study in Poland where “the recruitment was so fast that 
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Union provide CROs with eager drug trial participants and represent a 
boon in the large number of treatment–naïve candidates who have not 
built up resistance to new drugs, largely because of their infrequent use 
of antibiotics.84 Because many of the patients in these hospitals are in 
the advanced stages of their disease, these patients provide researchers 
with the ideal baseline for scientific study.85
 As might be expected, the chance that clinical trial participants 
will endure abuse at the hands of unsympathetic or overextended re-
searchers is high, with each stage of a clinical trial presenting its own 
challenges.86 During the planning phase, CROs must ensure that the 
research personnel have the requisite scientific background and ex-
perience, are not overburdened by other studies, and can effectively 
communicate with the researchers they employ.87 Further risks to drug 
trial participants result from CROs’ failure to emphasize the impor-
tance of obtaining safe, and not simply speedy, clinical trial results.88 
Because it is not clear whether CROs are accountable to the FDA di-
rectly or through the pharmaceutical companies sponsoring the drug 
trials, CROs report problems to the drug companies they work for 
rather than to federal regulatory agencies.89
                                                                                                                      
forty extra patients were enrolled at the sponsor’s request before some of the Western 
countries, still awaiting Ethics Committee’s approvals, had even started.” See Rehnquist, 
supra note 48, at 8. 
84 See Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 70. 
85 See id. 
86 See Barnes, supra note 77; Reymond, supra note 38. 
87 See Kristy Barnes, Managing Clinical Risk in Eastern Europe, Outsourcing-
Pharma.com, Nov. 8, 2006, http://www.outsourcing-pharma.com/Clinical-
Development/Managing-clinical-risk-in-Eastern-Europe. Dr. Albertas Valavicius, manager 
of Clinical Operations for Parexel International, a CRO based in Waltham, Massachusetts, 
explains that “[l]anguage issues can be problematic and paperwork needs to always be 
checked carefully, as well as the level of understanding of protocol etc. that staff members 
have.” See id. Additionally, the requisite equipment, including computers, email, fax, freez-
ers, cupboards and touch phones, is not always available, and CROs may find themselves 
missing vital materials unless they have allocated additional funds for their replacement. 
See id. Furthermore, “[e]ven when equipment is provided by the sponsor, it often has a 
nasty habit of disappearing during the course of the study.” See id. 
88 See Shuchman, supra note 38, at 1365. The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug De-
velopment found that CROs meet their deadlines by breaking the parts of each study 
(such as finding investigators and enrolling patients) into discrete steps. See id. at 1367. 
This process has been criticized as being a “commodization” of clinical research and has 
been accused of shifting researchers’ focus from the “totality of knowledge required to 
determine whether a drug is worth pursuing further” to data and hard deliverables. See id. 
89 See id. at 1366. 
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 In turn, the drug companies are delinquent in contacting regula-
tory authorities regarding health risks discovered with their products.90 
For its part, the FDA’s oversight of international CRO activity is mini-
mal at best, even for drugs manufactured by American pharmaceutical 
companies that need FDA approval to market and sell the drugs in the 
United States.91 In the former Soviet Union, CRO trial sites are spring-
ing up rapidly because the economically marginalized citizens are eager 
to act as trial subjects, transactional costs are low, and government over-
sight of CROs and the Western pharmaceutical manufacturers who 
employ them is limited. 92
C. The Benefit to the Former Soviet Union of Importing Drug Trials  
from the United States: The (Limited) Argument Favoring  
Clinical Trials Outsourcing 
 The potential for multi-million dollar savings by American phar-
maceutical companies conducting trials in the former Soviet Union 
underscores the disparities between the situations of clinical trial par-
ticipants in the United States and the former Soviet Union.93 However, 
those in favor of outsourcing drug testing argue that increased patient 
                                                                                                                      
90 See id. 
91 See generally Rehnquist, supra note 48. The report criticized the FDA for failing to 
track not only the number of investigators and patients participating in international clini-
cal trials, but also the number of international clinical sites at which American pharmaceu-
tical companies were conducting research. See id. at 20. Although the FDA requires that 
international trial sites be open for spot inspection, very few inspections actually take 
place; in 2004, when over 500 trials were conducted at approximately 3000 Russian sites, 
only 100 total FDA inspections took place overseas. See Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 72. Of 
the Russian sites that were inspected, over thirty percent failed to follow protocol, and one 
in twelve international sites was identified as having failed to report adverse patient reac-
tions. See id. This is not to say that the FDA is able to assure sufficient human-subject pro-
tection in its policing of U.S.-based trials. See id. Between 2000 and 2005, the FDA disquali-
fied only twenty-six investigators and discounted their data only twice despite finding 
“serious problems” 348 times within that period. See Gardiner Harris, Report Assails F.D.A. 
Oversight of Clinical Trials, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2007, at A1. 
92 See Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 72. Because the salaries of researchers conducting 
clinical trials in the former Soviet Union are “lavish” by local standards—a trials investiga-
tor in Russia can make ten times his salary recruiting patients instead of working as a state 
hospital employee—working for Western pharmaceutical companies is an attractive option 
for scientists. See id. An inherent danger already documented is the bribing of doctors in 
state hospitals and clinics for access to patients meeting pharmaceutical company’s re-
search study criteria. See id. Nevertheless, the December 2000 “Body Hunters” series in the 
Washington Post found that governments of developing countries remain eager to host 
pharmaceutical trials in order to infuse their health care systems with money. See Gatter, 
supra note 44, at 353. 
93 See Lustgarten, supra note 13, at 68–70. 
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access to medicine and free examinations of trial participants in devel-
oping nations are satisfactory compensation for the risks assumed by 
trial subjects.94 Besides soliciting drug trial volunteers in the former 
Soviet Union, Western pharmaceutical companies also target scientists 
to perform the actual clinical trials.95 Proponents of the export of clini-
cal trials view the international collaboration between Russian scientists 
and American pharmaceutical companies as a “win-win,” citing the 
combination of skilled Russian scientists eager to work for Western 
pharmaceutical companies and the countries’ history of scientific col-
laboration as rendering the former Soviet Union a natural choice for 
hosting the trials.96
 Organizations offering to facilitate collaboration between Ameri-
can pharmaceutical companies, scientists, and clinical test subjects in 
the former Soviet Union include the Civilian Research and Develop-
ment Foundation (CRDF), a nonprofit “public-private partnership” 
established in 1995 and authorized by the U.S. Congress and National 
Science Foundation.97 The CRDF, which is based in Arlington, Virginia 
                                                                                                                      
94 See id. at 69–70. Western pharmaceutical companies do occasionally conduct clinical 
trials on underprivileged populations for drugs being developed primarily to combat those 
populations’ health concerns; in a project organized by the U.S. Civilian Research & De-
velopment Foundation’s GAP Services program, the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, the World Health Organization, the U.S. Agency for International Development 
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emerging in Russia and other parts of the world in highly infectious, drug-resistant strains. 
See The U.S. Civilian Research & Development Foundation, Tackling the Threat of TB in 
Russia, http://www.crdf.org/stories/stories_show.htm?doc_id=298102 (last visited Apr. 9, 
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companies’ international market development strategy; by conducting drug research in 
regions that are gaining purchasing power, American pharmaceutical companies begin to 
develop markets for the drugs should they meet FDA approval. See Rehnquist, supra note 
48, at 8. 
95 See Finlay, supra note 5. 
96 See id. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, tens of thousands of Soviet weaponeers 
found themselves the unemployed targets of headhunters representing opportunities in 
Iran, North Korea, and terrorist organizations, all of whom offered lucrative compensa-
tion. See id. To prevent these scientists from becoming employed by countries antagonistic 
to the United States, the U.S. government in the 1990s began a national security campaign 
to “redirect” these highly trained and relatively inexpensive scientists and technicians to 
more peaceful pursuits, appropriating over $1 billion in research grants to former nuclear, 
biological and chemical and missile scientists between 1994 and 2006. See id. Today, gov-
ernment-sponsored “redirection” programs are losing momentum as the U.S. economy 
continues its economic downturn. See id. By employing large numbers of the former Soviet 
Union’s research scientists to conduct clinical drug trials, American pharmaceutical com-
panies are, in a sense, taking on the responsibility that the U.S. government’s “redirection” 
programs once shouldered. See id. 
97 See generally The Civilian Research and Development Foundation, supra note 94. 
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with offices in Moscow, Kiev, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, promotes 
international scientific and technical collaboration and the sustainabil-
ity of Eurasian science and technology communities through grants, 
technical resources, and training.98 A basic tenet of the CRDF is non-
proliferation, and the organization’s stated vision is “to promote peace 
and prosperity through international science collaboration.”99 An or-
ganization complementing the work of the CDRF is the United States 
Industry Coalition (USIC), a nonprofit made up of American busi-
nesses, associations, and research institutions that facilitates technology 
commercialization for the U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Initia-
tives for Proliferation Prevention program through redirection of 
weapons of mass destruction personnel towards sustainable civilian 
employment.100 USIC reports that it has facilitated business ventures 
worth hundreds of millions of dollars and created thousands of non-
military jobs in the former Soviet Union.101
IV. Customary International Law Regulating  
Human Clinical Testing 
 The lack of positive international law mandating universal proto-
cols in human drug testing and the FDA’s ability to sanction pharma-
ceutical companies’ circumvention of drug trial regulations under the 
Common Rule does not preclude an existing international customary 
regime from governing clinical trials.102 Such a regime exists already in 
the Nuremberg Code, a canon intended to define “universal ethical 
principles that would govern all medical research in the future.”103 This 
section analyzes two alternative sources of customary international 
law—the Nuremberg Code (the “Code”) and the Declaration of Hel-
sinki—and argues that the Nuremberg Code provides a sound, ethical 
                                                                                                                      
98 See id.; see also Finlay, supra note 5 (highlighting the work of the CRDF). 
99 See U.S. Civilian Research and Development Foundation: About CRDF, http://www. 
crdf.org/about/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
100 See Finlay, supra note 5; United States Industry Coalition: Overview, http://www. 
usic.net/about/index.cfm?cid=1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). 
101 See generally United States Industry Coalition: Overview, supra note 100. 
102 See Amy F. Wollensack, Note, Closing the Constant Garden: The Regulation and Responsi-
bility of U.S. Pharmaceutical Companies Doing Research on Human Subjects in Developing Nations, 
6 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 747, 764 (2007). The Second Circuit held in Flores v. 
South Peru Copper Corp. that customary international law encompasses “those rules that 
States universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual con-
cern.” See 343 F.3d 140, 154 (2d Cir. 2003). 
103 See Schott, supra note 59, at 47. Schott refers to the Nuremberg Code as “the first 
international legal document” among authorities setting forth ethical standards for inter-
national clinical testing. See id. 
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procedure that should be followed by Western pharmaceutical compa-
nies engaged in exporting clinical drug trials to less-developed coun-
tries. 
 The Nuremberg Code consists of ten directives for human medical 
experimentation.104 American judges set forth the Code in 1947, to-
                                                                                                                      
 
104 See 2 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals un-
der Control Council Law No. 10, at 181–82 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office 1949), available 
at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html [hereinafter Nuremberg Code]. 
The Nuremberg Code states: 
 1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This 
means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; 
should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without 
the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, 
or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient 
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved 
as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened decision. This 
latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision 
by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, 
duration, and purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it 
is to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; 
and the effects upon his health or person which may possibly come from his 
participation in the experiment. 
 The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent 
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experi-
ment. It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be delegated to 
another with impunity. 
 2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good 
of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and not random 
and unnecessary in nature. 
 3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the results of ani-
mal experimentation and a knowledge of natural history of the disease or 
other problem under study that the anticipated results will justify the per-
formance of the experiment. 
 4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all unnecessary 
physical and mental suffering and injury. 
 5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori reason 
to believe that death or disabling injury will occur; except, perhaps, in those 
experiments where the experimental physicians also serve as subjects. 
 6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by 
the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment. 
 7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to 
protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, 
disability, or death. 
 8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified 
persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be required through all 
stages of the experiment of those who conduct or engage in the experiment. 
 9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at 
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or 
mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be im-
possible. 
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gether with the verdicts of the Nuremberg “Doctors’ Trial” —the first of 
twelve trials against Nazi officials in which medical doctors, who carried 
out horrific, unethical medical experiments on humans, were found 
guilty of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity.105
 Today, the Nuremberg Code is widely regarded as the preeminent 
source of law and ethics on human testing.106 It has been labeled the 
“most accepted” and the “most cited” code of medical ethics.107 Unlike 
the FDA regulations and the Declaration of Helsinki, the Nuremberg 
Code places the responsibility of ensuring ethical medical experimenta-
tion directly in the hands of researchers.108 This is because the provi-
sions of the Nuremberg Code are directed at scientists and researchers 
rather than at the institutions they represent.109 Furthermore, the Code 
does not require that research be monitored and approved by inde-
pendent parties.110
 Opening with the declaration that “[t]he voluntary consent of the 
human subject is absolutely essential,” the Nuremberg Code prioritizes 
the welfare of test subjects and emphasizes the need for their informed 
                                                                                                                      
 10. During the course of the experiment the scientist in charge must be 
prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if he has probable cause 
to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judg-
ment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result 
in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject. 
See id. 
105 See Schott, supra note 59, at 46; William E. Seidelman, Nuremberg Lamentation: For the 
Forgotten Victims of Medical Science, 313 Brit. Med. J. 1463, 1463 (1996); Laughton, supra 
note 5, at 184. 
106 See Bartha Maria Knoppers & Madelaine Saginur, Bio-banking, in The Cambridge 
Textbook of Bioethics 167 (Peter A. Singer & A.M. Viens eds., 2008); Sharon Perley et 
al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in The Nazi Doctors and the Nurem-
berg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation 149, 149 (George J. Annas & 
Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992); Laughton, supra note 5 at 184–85. 
107 See Laughton, supra note 5, at 184 (citing Joel Levi, Medicine, The Holocaust, and The 
Doctors’ Trial, in Bioethical and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Trials and the 
Code of Nuremberg: Nuremberg Revisited 111, 116 ( Jacques J. Rozenberg ed., 2003)). 
Like the Nuremberg Code and other international codes and agreements, the Hippocratic 
Oath assigns the task of making decisions regarding human experiments to the clinician. 
See id. at 182. In taking the Hippocratic Oath, physicians pledge to provide care for the 
benefit of their patients; however, the exact benefit to be derived by the patient is to be 
determined by the physician. See id. 
108 See Cekola, supra note 16, at 144. 
109 See id. 
110 See id. Specifically, the Nuremberg Code states in the second paragraph of Provision 
1 that “the duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent rests upon 
each individual who initiates, directs or engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty 
and responsibility which may not be delegated to another with impunity.” Nuremberg 
Code, supra note 104, ¶ 1. 
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consent in the clinical trial process.111 To further protect their safety 
and welfare, the Code forbids the waiver of its principles by trial par-
ticipants and requires: 1) [p]roper preparations and facilities to be in 
place such that the subject is protected from “against even [a] remote 
possibili[ty] of injury, disability, or death”; 2) a valid research design to 
procure beneficial results that cannot be obtained by any other meth-
ods or means of study; 3) that the experimental design be “based on 
the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural 
history of the disease or clear problem under study”; 4) the avoidance 
of “all unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury” and the 
absence of any “a priori reason to believe that death or disabling in-
jury” would result from experimentation; 5) benefits that outweigh 
trial-related risks; 6) the presence of a qualified researcher who is pre-
pared to terminate an experiment if it “is likely to result in the injury, 
disability, or death of the experimental subject”; and 7) the subject’s 
ability to end the experiment should he reach a physical or mental state 
where he is unable or unwilling to continue.112
 In spite, or perhaps because of its humanitarian aims, the Nurem-
berg Code has not been universally embraced by the international 
community.113 The United States has neither ratified nor adopted the 
Nuremberg Code.114 Instead, U.S. federal regulations depart from the 
Code’s emphasis on the researcher’s authority in that they place re-
sponsibility with research institutions and IRBs rather than with the re-
searchers themselves.115 As a result, whether clinical trial participants 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Nuremberg Code, princ. 1, supra note 104. Merely obtaining the informed and 
voluntary consent of a test subject is insufficient under the Code, however, because the 
Code requires that all of its principles relating to the welfare of subjects be satisfied even 
before the subjects’ consent is sought. See George J. Annas, The Changing Landscape of Hu-
man Experimentation Nuremberg, Helsinki and Beyond, 2 Health Matrix 119, 121 (1992). 
112 See Nuremberg Code, supra note 104, ¶¶ 2–10. The provisions in paragraphs 5 and 
9 are of special importance because no subsequent assertion of ethical standards to be 
observed in human clinical trials contains them. See Annas, supra note 111, at 121; Schott, 
supra note 59, at 47. 
113 See George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin, Medical Ethics and Human Rights: Legacies 
of Nuremberg, 3 Hofstra L. & Pol’y Symp. 111, 113–14 (1999) (“[T]he Nuremberg Code 
has never been formally adopted as a whole by the United Nations.”); Evelyne Shuster, Fifty 
Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code, 337 N. Eng. J. Med. 1436, 1439 (1997) 
(“The Nuremberg Code has not been officially adopted in its entirety as law by any nation 
or as ethics by any major medical association.”). 
114 See Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 850 (Md. 2001) (“[T]he Nurem-
berg Code . . . [has] never been formally adopted by the relevant governmental entities.”); 
Ammend v. Bioport, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 848, 872 (W.D. Mich. 2004) (“No Supreme 
Court decision . . . has adopted the Nuremberg Code as constitutional law.”). 
115 See Laughton, supra note 5, at 194. 
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will suffer violations of the rights enumerated in the Code depends on 
the ethics of the researcher performing the trial—a researcher whose 
priority may often be to achieve specific scientific results.116
 The Code lacks the force of positive law and has never served as 
the sole basis for damages awards or the discipline of a scientist or re-
searcher.117 However, it is recognized as “an authoritative statement of 
the fundamental rights of research subjects in all nations,” and is pro-
duced as part of international criminal trials.118 In fact, courts in the 
United States have allowed the Code to be introduced as evidence of 
ethical principles existing in customary international law.119
 A combination of the Nuremberg Code’s lack of legal force and 
medical researchers’ concern that the Code is too “legalistic” and 
therefore insufficiently supportive of scientific progress led researchers 
to create a separate set of ethical standards after the Second World 
War.120 In July of 1964, the World Medical Association (WMA) incorpo-
rated as a non-profit educational and scientific organization in the 
State of New York, thus establishing the legal and financial status of the 
WMA in the United States.121 That same year, the WMA adopted the 
                                                                                                                      
116 See id. at 193 (citing Nuremberg Code, supra note 104, ¶¶ 1, 10 (“assigning to the 
researcher both the responsibility of obtaining informed consent and of determining 
when the experiment should be terminated”)). 
117 See George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics versus Expediency, in 
The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimen-
tation, supra note 106, at 201, 201; Kelleher, supra note 11, at 78. 
118 See Annas, supra note 117 at 201; Nicholas A. Christakis & Robert J. Levine, Multina-
tional Research, in 3 Encyc. of Bioethics 1780 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995). 
119 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
17, 2002); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 835, 849 (Md. 2001). In its discussion of 
the Nuremberg Code, the Grimes court stated that “the Nuremberg Code, at least in signifi-
cant part, was the result of legal thought and legal principles, as opposed to medical or scien-
tific principles, and thus should be the preferred standard for assessing the legality of scien-
tific research on human subjects. Under it, duties to research subjects arise.” See Grimes, 782 
A.2d at 835. The court also stated that the Code was meant to be applied internationally and 
never expressly rejected in the United States. See id. at 849. In Abdullahi, the court allowed the 
introduction of both the Declaration of Helsinki and the Nuremberg Code as evidence of 
principles of customary international law, but concluded that neither was “sufficiently univer-
sal” to establish a claim. See Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956, at *5; Laughton, supra note 5, at 
197. 
120 See Laughton, supra note 5, at 194–97. 
121 See The World Medical Association, About the WMA, http://www.wma.net/e/ 
about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2009). The WMA’s stated purpose is to “serve human-
ity by endeavoring to achieve the highest international standards in Medical Education, 
Medical Science, Medical Art and Medical Ethics, and Health Care for all people in the 
world.” Id. 
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Declaration of Helsinki, its best-known policy statement.122 The Decla-
ration of Helsinki is less trial participant-focused than the Nuremberg 
Code and is regarded by some as the definitive statement of medical 
ethics regarding medical research, in part because it was signed by the 
United States and incorporated into the FDA’s regulations for overseas 
clinical research in 1975.123
 The FDA’s position vis à vis the Declaration has changed, however, 
and the agency replaced the Declaration’s principles with a requirement 
of Good Clinical Practice in its regulation of the acceptance of non-IND 
(Investigational New Drug) foreign clinical studies.124 Some have ar-
gued that this move indicates that the FDA views ethical considerations 
as “expendable” when trial subjects live in the developing world, warn-
ing that the FDA’s rejection of the Declaration’s principles increases the 
potential of ethical violations in international trials.125 Although the 
FDA’s rejection of the Declaration’s principles deals a significant blow to 
the framework ensuring American pharmaceutical companies’ ethical 
conduct overseas, it must be noted that the Declaration, unlike the 
                                                                                                                      
122See Declaration of Helsinki, W.M.A. General Assembly, 1964, available at http://www. 
wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf; The World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki 
(2008), http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2009); Nuffield Coun-
cil on Bioethics, The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing 
Countries, Box 4.1 (2005), 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/HRRDC_Follow-up_Dis- 
cussion_Paper001.pdf [hereinafter Nuffield Discussion Paper]. 
123 See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 122; Shah, supra note 30, at 76; Nuffield 
Discussion Paper, supra note 122, at 65; Laughton, supra note 5, at 194. 
124 See Human Subject Protection; Foreign Clinical Studies Not Conducted Under an 
Investigational New Drug Application, 73 Fed. Reg. 82, 22800 (Apr. 28, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 312). In collaboration with WHO, the Council for International Or-
ganizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) published its own ethical guidelines in 2002. See 
Council for Int’l Org. of Medical Sci., International Ethical Guidelines for Bio-
medical Research Involving Human Subjects (2002), http://www.cioms.ch/frame_ 
guidelines_nov_2002.htm. The CIOMS Guidelines were intended to address the special 
circumstances that arise when applying the Declaration of Helsinki to research undertaken 
in developing countries and were revised in 1991, 1993 and in 2002. See Nuffield Discus-
sion Paper, supra note 122, at 4. The CIOMS Guidelines approvingly reference the Decla-
ration, in essence capturing the notion that “on the whole [the 1964 Declaration of Hel-
sinki] corrects what in the Nuremberg Rules was circumstantial, related to Nazi crimes, 
and places these Rules more correctly in the context of generally accepted medical tradi-
tions.” See Annas, supra note 111, at 123 (citing W. Refshauge, The Place for International 
Standards in Conducting Research for Humans, 55 Bull. World Health Org. 133, 137 
(1977)). However, as of October 2008, the FDA removed references to the Declaration of 
Helsinki from § 312.120. See 73 Fed. Reg. 82, 22800–01. 
125 See Trials on Trial, Nature, May 22, 2008, at 427–28; Silvia Camporesi, Letter to the 
Editor, The FDA Decision to Shelve the Helsinki Declaration: Ethical Considerations?, ecancermedi-
calscience, June 10, 2008, http://www.ecancermedicalscience.com/comment-letters-to-the-
editor.asp?doi=10.3332/eCMS.2008.LTR76#letter. 
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Code, always prioritized the protection of the scientific process over the 
health and safety of clinical trial participants.126 Whereas the Code holds 
a trial subject’s voluntary consent “absolutely essential,” the Declaration 
asks that a trial participant give his voluntary consent “if at all possi-
ble.”127 Furthermore, the Declaration’s encouragement of peer review 
of research protocols implies that a subject need not give informed con-
sent to participate in medical research if the physician submits his rea-
sons for not obtaining consent to an independent review committee.128 
Finally, the Declaration only feebly protects subjects’ interests in stating 
that independent review committees “must take into consideration the 
laws and regulations of the country or countries in which the research is 
to be performed as well as applicable international norms and stan-
dards.”129
 Critics of the Declaration accuse it of “marginalizing” the Code, 
and view its true goal as replacing the Code’s human rights-based 
agenda with a comparatively “lenient medical ethics model that permits 
paternalism.”130 Some of the Declaration’s most vehement opponents 
have an even more radical outlook; they view the Declaration as a con-
tinuation of the legacy of Nazism with the Code itself as the victim.131 
Though some hold the Declaration to be the more authoritative source 
of customary international law, the combination of its recent rejection 
by the FDA and its failure to advocate to the fullest for the protection of 
trial participants renders it the inferior source of protection clinical 
trial participants.132 Therefore it is the Nuremberg Code that should be 
accepted by the United States as the customary international standard 
to be implemented in regulating U.S. pharmaceutical companies’ ex-
port of clinical drug trials.133
                                                                                                                      
126 See Khan, supra note 22, at 887–89; Laughton, supra note 5, at 195–96. 
127 See Laughton, supra note 5, at 195. Furthermore, the Declaration delineates circum-
stances under which researchers may conduct clinical trials without obtaining patients’ 
informed consent. See Annas, supra note 111, at 123. For instance, the Declaration (unlike 
the Code) allows a trial subject’s proxy to give consent on behalf of the patient where the 
patient is legally or physically incapacitated. See Laughton, supra note 5, at 195. 
128 See Annas, supra note 111, at 123. Some detractors of the Declaration believe that 
“[t]he Declaration of Helsinki . . . undermined the primacy of subject consent in the Nur-
emberg [C]ode and replaced it with the paternalistic values of the traditional doctor-
patient relationship.” See Seidelman, supra note 105, at 1465. 
129 See  The World Medical Association, Declaration of Helsinki (2008), supra note 122, 
¶ 15. 
130 See Annas, supra note 111, at 122. 
131 See Seidelman, supra note 105, at 1465. 
132 See id. at 1465–66; Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769–71. 
133 See Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769–71. 
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V. The Solution: The United States Must Recognize the 
Nuremberg Code as International Customary Law  
Regulating Human Clinical Testing 
 Clinical trial participants in developing countries who fall victim to 
unethical treatment in international scientific investigations must have 
recourse under customary international law.134 Ideally, such victims 
would be able to establish a cause of action by demonstrating the viola-
tion of one or several of the principles of the Nuremberg Code, a cause 
of action that would allow the victim to hold accountable the re-
searcher conducting the drug trial as well as the pharmaceutical com-
pany sponsoring the trial and the CRO overseeing the researcher’s ac-
tivities.135 To better understand why this solution is the most viable, 
competing ideas must be examined.136
 One way to ensure the health and safety of clinical research sub-
jects is to centralize the review of clinical trials.137 Supporters of this 
solution claim it will enable the concentration of scientific expertise as 
well as improve the efficiency of the review process.138 However, it is 
uncertain whether a centralized process would be more efficient, espe-
cially because it is unclear who would manage the centralizing—a fed-
eral agency, a private entity subject to federal oversight, or something 
in between.139 Criticisms of this solution focus on the difficulty of in-
corporating regional and institutional variations into the regulation 
process, as well as the risk that a centralized authority may increase the 
chance of self-interested behavior on the part of researchers, leading to 
an even more adversarial relationship between clinical researchers and 
regulations.140
 Because of these concerns, Professor Ken Gatter suggests that “fine-
tuning and better enforcement of existing regulations will not remedy 
the underlying structural instability resulting from the conflicting 
norms.”141 Rather than instituting a new system of government over-
sight, opponents of a centralized system, such as Professor Robert Gat-
                                                                                                                      
134 See id. 
135 See Gatter, supra note 44, at 351–52; Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769–71. 
136 See Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769–71. 
137 See id. 
138 See Gatter, supra note 37, at 620. 
139 See id. 
140 See id. 
141 See id. at 623. The specific conflicting norms Professor Ken Gatter refers to are “in-
formed consent with its normative basis in autonomy, the research community with its 
utilitarian normative structure; and the fiduciary model of the therapeutic clinical setting.” 
See id. 
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ter, suggest that conflicts of interest in human research may be avoided 
by researchers’ self-regulation and only minimal prohibitions; the con-
cern is that an extensive system of prohibiting financial conflicts would 
only lead to strategic behavior to evade them.142 Another proposed solu-
tion is for Congress to establish a voluntary plaintiff’s forum in the 
United States under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).143 Proponents of this 
approach suggest that Congress could choose to recognize either of two 
international doctrines, the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights or the Nuremberg Code, to create a right of action under the 
ATS.144
 A solution that subscribes to Robert Gatter’s theory and harnesses 
the benefits of the ATS while avoiding the criticisms directed at the 
concept of a centralized review system is for the United States to recog-
nize the Nuremberg Code as customary international law, permitting 
plaintiffs a cause of action against American pharmaceutical companies 
when their rights under the Code are violated.145 However, unlike Wol-
lensack’s proposal to create the forum within the United States, the 
ideal solution would not require the specific designation of a particular 
venue for the forum.146 A U.S.-based forum would place unnecessary 
hardship on injured clinical drug trial participants who would, for the 
most part, be unable to travel to the United States to appear in court.147 
Instead, an acceptable forum should be deemed to be any country 
where a pharmaceutical company conducts its clinical research—after 
all, the final decision to carry out research in a host country is always 
the pharmaceutical company’s to make.148
                                                                                                                      
142 See id. at 623, 626. Professor Robert Gatter also warns that as long as some countries 
willingly ignore ethical guidelines to obtain the short-term financial benefits that come 
with hosting human trials, even a coalition of countries cooperating to strengthen domes-
tic drug laws will be unlikely to protect human drug trial participants. See Gatter, supra note 
44, at 363–64. 
143 See Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); Wollensack, supra note 102, at 
769. 
144 See Nuremberg Code, supra note 104; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 20, 1966), available at http:// 
documents.un.org/simple.asp (search “A/6316” in symbol field); Wollensack, supra note 102, 
at 769. It is worth noting that Wollensack’s excellent Note, which focuses on the misdeeds of 
Pfizer in Nigeria, devotes only a handful of sentences to the Nuremberg Code and makes no 
direct reference to it in the Conclusion. See Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769–71. 
145 See Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769. 
146 See id. at 769–71. 
147 But see id. 
148 See id. 
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Conclusion 
 Despite the Nuremberg Code’s shortcomings, the standards it sets 
forth provide a viable solution to prevent the unethical treatment of 
clinical trial participants by CROs employed by American pharmaceuti-
cal companies.149 This is because the existing customary international 
law presented by the Code places the onus of ensuring ethical treat-
ment of trial participants on the very clinicians performing the trials.150 
The Code’s principles are clear, succinct, and humanitarian in nature, 
and the Code is already perceived as constituting an international cus-
tomary regime.151 This solution is not inappropriately bold, as the Nur-
emberg Code’s principles already “set the framework for United States 
federal regulations as well as . . . international guidelines.”152 The citi-
zens of the former Soviet Union, like all participants in drug trials, de-
serve not only a means of asserting their right to ethical treatment, but 
also a clear statement of what that ethical treatment should be.153 By 
acknowledging the Nuremberg Code as customary international law 
and not merely a set of guidelines, the United States government would 
shift the burden of regulating drug trials to researchers, and would si-
multaneously make American pharmaceutical companies and the 
CROs they employ accountable for the research protocols they write.154 
Adoption of the Code as customary international law would provide a 
right of recourse to clinical trial participants in the former Soviet Un-
ion and around the world, thus ensuring the drug test subjects of 
American Big Pharma the protections of the Nuremberg Code.155
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150 See Cekola, supra note 16, at 144. 
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154 See Gatter, supra note 44, 351–52; Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769–71. 
155 See Wollensack, supra note 102, at 769. 
